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The Demography Policy Issues for the
of New England: Balance of This
Century
George S. Masnick
New England s rapidly aging population, its traditionally low fertility rate, and the fact
that net migration from other regions and abroad should continue to be close to zero
means that only very slow population growth will characterize the region for the balance
of this century. Nevertheless, New England s demographic metabolism is exceptionally
dynamic: (1) the numbers of different age groups are growing at very different rates;
(2) a redistribution ofpopulation is occurring from the southern to northern tier states;
(3) within each state population is dispersing into nonmetropolitan areas; and (4) metro-
politan areas, both central and suburban, are quickly changing their demographic com-
position. Each of these trends has different public policy implications.
Between 1970 and 1980 the population in the six-state New England region increased by
slightly more than 4 percent. This was a relatively poor performance compared with the
almost 13 percent increase in population experienced by the region during each of the two
previous decades, and poorer still compared with population growth rates that were five
times as large during the 1970s in the South and West (Table 1). The Census Bureau
estimates that New England will approach zero population growth by the year 2000. New
England's rapidly aging population, its traditionally low fertility rate, and the fact that net
migration from other regions and abroad should continue to be close to zero are the reasons
that slow growth should prevail for the region as a whole for the remainder of this century
and beyond. Slow growth, however, should not be interpreted as a sign of demographic
stagnation. On the contrary, New England's population is exceptionally dynamic.
Four aspects ofNew England's demographic metabolism deserve special attention
because of their general implications for public policy:
New England has an extremely uneven age structure. Over time, an uneven age structure
results in a poor matchup between people and classrooms, jobs, housing, hospital beds,
recreation facilities, etc. One aspect of the changing age structure in New England worthy
of special attention is the projected decline in the size of the entry-level labor force and the
rapid aging of those currently employed.
Within the six-state region there are sharp differences between demographic processes in
the northern tier states (Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont) and the southernmost tier
states (Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut). This variability is resulting in a
redistribution ofpopulation among the New England states.
George S. Masnick is a Research Associate at the Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard University and
Analysis and Forecasting Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Between 1970 and 1980 nonmetropolitan areas grew at rates that were more than 50 percent
higher than metropolitan growth rates, resulting in a continuing shift in population to out-
lying suburbs and small towns. A continued dispersion ofpopulation should be expected
for the remainder of this century, and it will place constant strain on existing infrastructure,
whereas areas experiencing population decline will have fewer resources available for the
maintenance of existing infrastructure.
Within metropolitan areas, where the majority ofNew England's residents still live,
changes in the demographic structure ofboth central cities and the suburbs will continue to
alter their socio-demographic profiles. These changes include the aging of the suburban
populations, decline in the dominance of the traditional nuclear family, and the continued
prevalence of poverty endemic to certain categories of single-parent, single-person and
single-earner households.
These changes will lead to a New England in the year 2000 that will contain approxi-
mately the same number of people as in 1980, but which will be significantly different in its
demographic composition. These changes will call for increased awareness and appropriate
responses on the part of both the public and private sectors. Some responses may actually
influence the demographic trends. For the most part, however, we need to see the changes
as inevitable constraints and opportunities for planning and management decisions.
Table 1
Population of U.S. Census Regions, 1950-1980
Population (thousands)
914 969 994 1,125
533 607 738 921
378 390 445 511
4,691 5,149 5,689 5,737
792 859 950 947
2,007 2,535 3,032 3,108
Census Region 1950 1960 1970 1980
Total U.S 151 ,375 1 79,322 203,296 226,502
New England 9,315 10,509 11,848 12,349
Ratio: New England/
Total U.S .062 .059 .058 .055
Me
N.H
Vt
Mass
R.I
Ct
Northeast {Me., N.H., Vt,
Mass., R.I. , Ct, N.Y.,N.J.,
Pa.) 39,478 44,677 49,057 49,137
North Central [Ohio, Ind., III.,
Mich., Wis., Minn., Iowa, Mo.,
N.D., S.D. Kans., Neb.
)
44,462 51,619 56,585 58,851
South (Del., Md., D.C., Va.,
W. Va., N.C., S.C., Ga., Fla.,
Ky., Tenn., Ala., Miss., Ark.,
La., Ok/a., Tex.) 47,244 54,973 62,81
2
75,348
West (Mont, Ida., Wyo., Colo.,
N.M., Ariz., Utah, Nev., Wash.,
Oreg., Cal., Alas., Hi .) 20,191 28,053 34,842 43,166
(continued on next page)
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Table 1 (continued from previous page)
Population of U.S. Census Regions, 1950-1980
Rate of Growth over Decade (%)
Census Region
Total U.S
New England
Ratio: New England/
Total U.S
Me
N.H
Vt
Mass
R.I
Ct
Northeast {Me., N.H., Vt,
Mass., R.I., Ct, N. Y., N.J.,
Pa.)
North Central (Ohio, Ind., III.,
Mich., Wis., Minn., Iowa, Mo.,
N.D., S.D. Kans., Neb.
)
South (Del., Md., D.C., Va.,
W. Va., N.C., S.C., Ga., Fla.,
Ky., Tenn., A la., Miss., Ark.,
La., Ok/a., Tex.
)
West (Mont, Ida., Wyo., Colo.,
N.M., Ariz., Utah, Nev., Wash.,
Oreg., Cal., Alas., Hi.)
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Historical
Times to 1970; Advanced Reports 1980
1950-60
18.5
12.8
.692
13.2
16.1
16.4
38.9
1960-70
13.4
12.7
.947
9.8
9.6
14.3
24.2
1970-80
11.4
4.2
.368
6.0 2.5 13.2
13.9 21.6 24.8
3.2 14.1 14.8
9.8 10.5 0.8
8.5 10.5 -0.3
26.3 19.6 2.5
0.2
4.0
20.0
23.9
Statistics of the United States: Colonial
Census of Population and Housing.
Uneven Age Structure
Probably the most important demographic event of the twentieth century has been the
post-World War II "baby boom" and subsequently the "baby bust." New England has
been especially hard hit by the fertility rate swing because its pre-World War II fertility
levels were already extremely low, second only to the Mid-Atlantic region (New York,
New Jersey and Pennsylvania), and its boom took fertility rates to just above the na-
tional average in 1960. By 1980, New England's fertility rate fell to 87 percent of the
national average. And statistics suggest there has been little change in New England's
relative position during the first half of the 1980s. New England women continue to
bear their children later and have smaller families compared with women in the rest of
the country.
The twentieth century fertility swing has resulted in a population in which at any
given time, the numbers of different age groups are growing at very different rates.
Table 2 compares growth in eight age groups for the decade 1970-80 with that projected
by the Bureau of Census for the last two decades of this century. We see that the 15-24,
25-34 and 35-44 age groups are expected to experience especially sharp declines during
the next decade for the region as a whole and for each New England state as well. On
Table 2
Percentage Change in Population in Different Age Groups for
New England States, 1970-2000
Age Group
and State
Under 15
New England
Me
N.H
Vt
Mass
R.I
Ct
15-24
New England
Me
N.H
Vt
Mass
R.I
Ct
25-34
New England
Me
N.H
Vt
Mass
R.I
Ct
35-44
New England
Me
N.H
Vt
Mass
R.I
Ct
45-54
New England
Me
N.H
Vt
Mass
R.I
Ct
1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000
Observed Projected 8 Projected
% % %
-21.5 - 6.5 - 3.6
-10.1 0.6 0.2
- 3.3 15.0 15.7
-11.2 5.6 3.7
-25.2 -10.7 - 7.7
-23.1 - 9.8 - 6.7
-24.2 - 9.6 - 6.6
15.4
43.0
4.1
- 9.0
-22.5
12.9
43.9
6.4
14.4
21.2 -15.4 - 5.5
32.6 - 5.7 4.6
24.1 -16.0 - 2.5
12.4 -25.6 19.2
3.3 -24.4 -18.3
13.5 -24.9 -17.2
-28.4
62.4 16.6 -15.7
76.3 31.6 - 5.8
65.3 17.1 -16.1
40.2 9.7 -25.9
36.4 11.6 -24.7
31.0 10.6 -25.1
10.8
12.6 58.2 14.3
31.3 74.2 29.1
22.9 60.8 14.5
0.1 42.1 7.3
5.0 44.3 9.1
3.7 30.5 8.4
41.3
2.0 11.1 55.4
10.7 31.7 70.4
3.0 24.1 57.0
-12.6 1.8 38.0
-15.7 - 0.3 41.4
-11.3 5.6 28.0
25
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Table 2 (continued from previous page)
Percentage Change in Population in Different Age Groups for
New England States, 1970-2000
Age Group 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000
and State Observed Projected 3 Projected 3
55-64 % % %
New England 12.2 - 9.9 7.2
Me 13.4 - 1.0 11.0
N.H 25.6 9.5 31.7
Vt 12.4 2.2 24.2
Mass 8.3 -13.1 2.2
R.I 12.2 -15.8 0.3
Ct 18.4 -11.7 6.2
65 +
New England 19.6 17.5 2.4
Me 23.5 17.0 7.2
N.H 31.9 30.3 10.3
Vt 23.0 17.5 9.4
Mass 14.7 12.8 - 1.6
R.I 22.3 17.8 - 1.3
Ct 26.9 23.4 3.3
All Ages
New England 4.3 3.1 0.3
Me 13.2 9.3 6.4
N.H 24.8 23.7 19.7
Vt 14.8 12.3 3.7
Mass 0.3 - 0.6 - 3.7
R.I - 0.3 0.4 - 2.6
Ct 2.5 0.9 - 2.3
Source: 1970 Census of Population, General Characteristics; 1980 Census of
Population, Supplementary Reports, PC80-51-1 (May 1981); Current Population
Reports, P-25, No. 937 (August 1983).
3Census Bureau mid-series projections assuming 1970-80 migration patterns.
Note: Observed change 1970-80 from April 1 to April 1; projected change
1980-1990 from April 1 to July 1; projected change 1990-2000 from July 1 to
July 1.
the other hand, for New England as a whole, and within each state, only the number of
those over age 65 is expected to increase over the next decade at a rate close to the rate
of increase observed from 1970 to 1980.
Another way of looking at this process, termed disorderly cohort succession, is pre-
sented in Figure 1 . Reading from left to right, we follow the size of ten-year birth
cohorts as they age between 1970 and 2000. Such decennial cohorts born before 1945
in New England numbered from between 1.25 and 1.5 million and, because of their
approximately equal numbers, succeeded one another in the age structure in quite an
orderly fashion. Cohorts born between 1946 and 1965, however, totaled between 2.0
and 2.3 million. These cohorts have put a strain on the orderly process of cohort sue-
Figure 1
Disorderly Cohort Succession
New England States, 1970-2000
Cohort
Size
2,500,000
C.1956-65
27
2,000,000
C. 1946-55
1,500,000
C. 1966-75
C. 1976-85
"•A
C. 1936-45
C. 1916-25
1,000,000
Legend: Year
X 1970
• 1980
1990
2000
C. 1926-35
A
500,000 • Observed
A Projected
5-14
Age
Source: See Table 3.
15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75
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cession. The problem has been one of society trying to accommodate too many people
with too few slots in the social structure. Over the past three decades, these slots have
been sequentially: maternity beds, elementary schools, college admissions, entry-level
jobs, and rental apartments. For the balance of this century, the slots in short supply
will be single-family-owned housing, job promotions, accommodations for leisure ac-
tivities, and increasingly, social welfare programs benefiting the elderly.
The down side of disorderly cohort succession has occurred as the number of cohorts
born since 1965 has dropped quickly to almost "normal" size. This decline is not with-
out shrinking pains. We have already witnessed the closing of neighborhood elementary
schools, and have begun to experience shortages in the entry-level work force, particu-
larly in retail sales.
Youth unemployment is expected to decline dramatically, and when it does occur
28 during the remainder of this century, unemployment will be more a product of poor
match-up between skill levels and job requirements than a poor ratio of new jobs to new
job seekers. Crime rates will likewise fall in the future, both because there will be fewer
teenagers and young adults to commit crimes, and because this group will be more
likely to have jobs that pay reasonable wages (assuming entry-level wage levels will
rise to help regulate imbalances in supply and demand).
Higher education will face new challenges because of the shrinking numbers in the
traditional student age population, but new opportunities will be found in the need to
retrain those in the older baby-boom cohorts when job security and promotions are
blocked by their own large numbers. And should the smaller number of cohorts born
during the 1965-80 period have small families themselves (as did their parents' gener-
ation), the echo of the baby bust, due to be set in motion in the late 1990s, would truly
create new dimensions to the problem of shrinking cohort size.
For the next ten to fifteen years, however, the major consequences of disorderly co-
hort succession will be felt by those who are already adults. The reversal in the strong
positive growth of student and entry-level labor force ages will pose serious problems
for those colleges and employers who have become accustomed to the excess demand
created by the baby boom glut. At colleges and in the work place, recruitment,
retraining and retention will become the three Rs. The old strategy of selecting only
the "best" of the young applicants and then treating them shabbily will no longer work
as it did when an overabundance of well-educated baby boomers dominated the entry
pools.
With a healthy economy and a growing shortage of young adults, New England will
need to husband its student and young adult labor force with far greater care. Primary
and secondary school students, a growing percentage of whom are minorities in many
communities, will need to receive the best education in basic reading, writing, and math
skills. The current crop of high school dropouts and graduates with less than adequate
formal education will need remedial programs. Linking remedial training to definite job
opportunities will help ensure lower dropout rates, so the involvement of employers in
training programs will be beneficial. If the reward is not only a job, but a well-paying
job with clear opportunities for career mobility, remedial training programs could be-
come much more successful than those of the past.
Sometimes it is not a poor match-up between job requirements and employee skills
that stands in the way of hiring and promotion. Attitudes, prejudices and expectations
on the part of both employers and workers play an equally important role. Three groups
who have been relatively undervalued human resources will take on new importance in
the decades ahead. These are minorities, women (particularly married women and
mothers), and middle-aged and older persons, of all social and demographic character-
istics. Here, the programs and policies will be a lot less concrete than in the case of the
three Rs. Sensitivity to the special needs of working mothers, handicapped persons, and
minorities with language problems must be balanced with a recognition that such work-
ers must be treated in most ways like any others. Otherwise, prejudice will maintain the
cultural barriers to full employment that have been erected over the years.
Nor is it exclusively in the realms of educational initiatives or employer/employee
contracts that policies can help to offset the effects of a shrinking labor force. Long,
stressful, or expensive commutes to and from work take their toll on the ability to
recruit workers and on their productivity at the work place. The proximity of housing
and day care to the workers' jobs, the cost and quality of public transportation, and the 29
maintenance of highway and parking facilities all figure prominently in the goal of
achieving a better match-up between people and jobs, and their greater productivity.
Mobility Patterns
Transportation and job location policies will take on more significance because of two
additional and unalterable facts about the future of New England's labor force: it will
get older and it will be less mobile. The projected rapid growth of the 35- to 44-year-old
and 45- to 54-year-old segments of the population will mean that the median age of the
labor force will increase by over five years by the end of the century. 1
The sifting and sorting that normally takes place among people and jobs is greatly
enhanced when the labor force is young because young adults are more willing to relo-
cate to where the job opportunities are to be found. In contrast, older workers are much
less geographically mobile. Table 3 presents the percentage of residents in three age
categories who did not change residence between 1975 and 1980. The three groups
span the age range through which the baby-boom workers will pass during the next two
decades. Whereas only 22 percent of all 25- to 29-year-olds in the United States were
living in the same house after five years, fully two-thirds of all 45- to 49-year-olds had
not moved. In New England, almost three-quarters of 45- to 49-year-olds had not moved
after five years, reflecting the greater immobility of New Englanders of all ages.
The differences between mobility rates in the Northeast and those in the West are
especially striking. When workers do change jobs in the future, fewer changes will
involve residential moves as well. Thus, job changes that do not also involve a change
in residence will tend to increase the burden placed on all levels of the transportation
system.
Since before World War II, net migration from outside New England has not been
much of a major factor in the growth pattern of the region as a whole. Net migration
was close to zero in both the 1950-60 and 1970-80 decades and was only 3 percent in
the 1960s. Zero net migration can result from a large amount of migration into the
region (counterbalanced by a large outmigration), as well as by small gross migration
flows in and out. Focusing only on immigrants from other states, the data reveal a
slightly lower rate into New England than the national average, with 9. 1 percent of all
1980 residents over the age of five having lived in another state in 1975 (Table 4).
Moreover, the vast majority of immigrants from other states came to New England
from other Northeast states (63.7 percent), whereas a majority of interstate immigrants
living in other regions in 1980 came from states outside the region in which they now
New England Journal of Public Policy Winter/Spring 1985
Table 3
Percentage of Residents Living in Same House in both 1975 and 1980
in Selected Age Groups for Regions and New England States
Age Group
All Ages
Over 5 25-29 35-39 45-49
% % % %
Total U.S 56.9 22.0 49.5 68.4
New England 59.1 24.0
Me 56.9 24.0
N.H 51.6 18.6
Vt 54.4 20.7
30 Mass 61.0 25.1
R.I 60.4 26.6
Ct 59.0 23.2
Northeast 61 .7 27.4
North Central 55.4 21 .3
South 52.4 23.4
West 43.8 15.3
54.9 73.9
56.4 71.9
50.2 66.6
54.9 71.3
57.3 76.7
55.1 73.7
51.8 72.4
57.3 75.3
52.6 71.7
48.5 66.5
38.7 58.6
Source: 1980 Census of Population, Detailed Characteristics.
reside. In New Hampshire, the New England state having the highest share of its popu-
lation coming from outside of the state (18.5 percent, twice the New England average),
76 percent came from other states in the Northeast. Even among the highly mobile
25-29 age group, where 32 percent of New Hampshire's 1980 residents were recent
interstate immigrants, percentage from within the Northeast holds firm. State-to-state
migration flows between 1975 and 1980 have not yet been released by the Bureau of
the Census, but if findings from the 1970 census are any indication, we can estimate
that the vast majority of interstate immigrants from the Northeast living in New
England continue to come from within the region itself.
It is therefore clear that state boundaries within the region are a good deal more per-
meable than state boundaries that define the region. In other words, demographic flows
among New England states appear to supplement and reinforce cultural and economic
ties and help give greater definition to the region.
The combination of New England's changing age structure and already low mobility
rates leads to an important consequence for human resource policy. The vast majority
of what will be New England's labor force in the year 2000 already lives and works in
the region today. As this labor force ages and becomes even less mobile, maintaining a
good match-up between workers' capabilities and job requirements will mean that all of
the principal actors (employers, higher education, labor unions, government, etc.) think
more in terms of what present workers can offer. Lynn Browne has shown that New
England workers already have quite a lot to offer. 2 They are attached to their jobs
(higher participation rates, less time lost from strikes), are well educated, intelligent,
and highly skilled. Strangely, in spite of these qualifications, they also appear to be
willing to work for relatively low wages. 3 These are all characteristics which make
further investment in New England's workers an attractive allocation of resources with
prospects of good payoffs. While many fear that an aging and relatively immobile work-
Table 4
Percentage of 1980 Residents Age 5 and Older Living in Another State
in 1975 by Region of Residence in 1975
All Interstate
Reqion of Moves as a Region of Residence in 1975 of Interstate Migrants
Residence Percent North
in 1980 of Total Northeast Central South West
% % % % %
Total U.S 9.7 22.5 25.6 31 .4 20.5
New England .... 9.1 63.7 10.3 17.2 8.8
Me 10.7 63.1 8.8 18.0 10.1
N.H 18.5 76.1 6.1 11.4 6.4
Vt 14.3 72.6 7.1 12.9 7.4
Mass 7.0 59.5 12.2 18.6 9.7
R.I 8.7 67.8 7.9 16.8 7.5
Ct 9.3 59.4 12.2 19.4 9.0
Northeast 6.1 54.5 12.8 23.4 9.3
North Central .... 7.0 12.2 44.4 26.9 16.5
South 11.9 21.7 22.4 43.5 12.4
West 13.4 14.6 23.6 19.9 41.9
Source: 1980 Census of Population: Detailed Characteristics, various state volumes.
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force will increase the incentives for employers to automate and invest in machines
instead of people, such policies are perhaps less likely to displace existing workers.
Instead, high technology might well address problems that arise from the anticipated
shortage of new entry-level workers; that is, automation of repetitive, low-level jobs
could reduce the need for these employees. And at the same time, the new technologi-
cal solution in the work place may depend on the older, experienced existing workers
for their implementation.
Redistribution of Population
During the post-World War II period, there has been a swing in migration among the
New England states—first from north to south, then from south to north. During the
1950s the fastest growing state was Connecticut, its growth fueled by high natural
increase (the baby boom) and high net migration. The latter factor is significant for the
entire region in that much of the outmigration experienced by Maine and Vermont in
the 1950s was into the southern tier (including southern New Hampshire). By 1980,
however, the population flows had reversed: Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Con-
necticut all experiencing net outmigration, and Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont
experiencing strong gains (Table 5). This general growth pattern is expected to continue
into the next decade, resulting in a shift of population northward.
The symbiosis of population movements among the six states in the region is impor-
tant to underscore. Part of the explanation for what might appear as migratory provin-
cialism within New England can be accounted for by the great diversity that exists
within the region. During the great rural depopulation of the 1950s, migrants from Ver-
mont, Maine, and New Hampshire needed to go only as far as Connecticut to find a
burgeoning economy in aerospace, insurance, and light manufacturing. During the high-
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Table 5
Components of Growth in New England States: 1950-1980
Natural
Increase
Net
Migration
32
New England
Me
N.H
Vt
Mass
R.I
Ct
%
12.6
12.1
11.5
13.2
9.8
11.8
14.6
%
0.2
- 6.1
2.4
-10.0
0.0
- 3.3
11.7
1950-1960
Total
Growth
%
12.8
6.0
13.9
3.2
9.8
8.5
26.3
1960-1970
Natural
Increase
Net
Migration
Total
Growth
New England
Me
N.H
Vt
Mass
R.I
Ct
%
9.7
9.6
10.2
10.3
9.1
9.0
11.2
%
3.0
- 7.1
11.4
3.8
1.4
1.5
8.4
%
12.7
2.5
21.6
14.1
10.5
10.5
19.6
1970-1980
Natural Net Total
Increase Migration Growth
% % %
New England 4.1 0.1 4.2
Me 5.1 8.1 13.2
N.H 6.1 18.7 24.8
Vt 5.8 9.0 14.8
Mass 3.5 - 2.7 0.8
R.I 3.6 - 3.9 - 0.3
Ct 4.2 - 1.7 2.5
Sources: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1961, 1972; Advance Report,
1980 Census of Population and Housing, PHC 80, various state volumes;
Monthly Vital Statistics Reports, various issues, 1972-1980.
technology revolution of the late 1970s, the magnet for the young was the area along
the Massachusetts/New Hampshire border. Cape Cod has continued (as it has through-
out the post-World War II period) to attract retirement migrants from within the region,
and Boston has continued to attract students. When the nonmetropolitan revival began,
the northern tier states were well positioned to lay claim to those metropolitan migrants
in search of a slower pace of life. For those seeking low taxes, New Hampshire was just
the place; for others more willing to pay for good public services, Massachusetts was
their destination. It appears that a normal reluctance to move on the part of New England
residents is complemented by a tendency on the part of those who do move to be largely
satisfied with the alternatives offered close at hand. And the alternatives are legion.
Dispersion of Population
One important dimension of the recent shift in population from south to north has been
the propensity on the part of those who do not move to favor residence outside metro-
politan areas. Indeed, this shift in migration favoring nonmetropolitan growth has been
a nationwide phenomenon. 4 In New England, this trend has been manifest since 1950,
but during the early part of the post-World War II period, it took place mostly in the
southern tier states. For example, during the past decade Massachusetts experienced the
most significant growth of its nonmetropolitan population, which increased by 36 per-
cent, compared to a 9 percent increase in Connecticut and a 14 percent loss in Rhode
Island. During the same ten-year period, the nonmetropolitan population in the three
northern tier states grew by between 14 and 21 percent. 5
It is clear that rejuvenated nonmetropolitan growth is a powerful force shaping the
distribution of population throughout the United States. One important component is
simply the spillover of metropolitan population into adjacent nonmetropolitan areas.
These are often places to which jobs as well as people are moving. Growth in other
areas is exclusively residential, a process of "suburbanization" which has been occur-
ring for many decades. What is new is the revived growth of the more remote non-
metropolitan areas. Many of these nonadjacent, nonmetropolitan destinations appear to
offer less in the way of economic opportunities than do metropolitan locations. This has
led many analysts to conclude that factors other than employment opportunities, perhaps
involving lifestyle choices, are important in the new migration patterns. The interstate
highway system allowing easier access to metropolitan centers, the shift toward less
dependence on earned income, and the re-emerging importance of home-based employ-
ment could support those lifestyle choices and contribute to the new growth pattern.
In some cases, nonmetropolitan areas are offering unusually attractive economic
opportunities, such as occurs when a large new employer locates in the area. The most
dramatic example of such growth in New England is in the countryside around Danbury,
Connecticut, where Union Carbide has moved its corporate headquarters from New
York City. In other cases, an attractive balance among economic, family, community,
and leisure activities appears to be the drawing card. Still other areas are attractive sim-
ply because of their remoteness: those people frustrated with urban social problems will
endure significant economic, cultural and social deprivation, if only for short periods,
in order to "get away." It should be concluded that because nonmetropolitan growth
appears to be driven by so many engines, it is likely to be sustained for the remainder
of this century and beyond. Such a trend will place new challenges before us, since
many of the decisions made during the early post-World War II period concerning the
location of government services, health care institutions, educational facilities, and
housing were premised upon a continuing growth of metropolitan population.
The impact of the gradual shift in population from metropolitan to nonmetropolitan
areas often has a dramatic impact at the local level. Small nonmetropolitan communities
who find their populations suddenly growing by 50 percent or more in the course of one
decade, and then growing slowly or not at all the next, find planning for growth exas-
perating. The impact on large metropolitan areas is less dramatic but more inexorable.
Changes within Metropolitan Areas
33
During the 1970s, 86 percent of metropolitan central cities in the Northeast lost popula-
tion, as did many of their inner suburbs. Since three-quarters of New England's popu-
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lation live in its twenty-nine Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA) 6 (about
the same fraction as for the United States as a whole), we need to take a closer look at
the dimensions of metropolitan area population change. In addition to loss of popula-
tion, other demographic shifts in cities and suburbs include racial turnover, the "gray-
ing" of the suburbs and consequent decline in the presence of children, the growth of
nonfamily households, the increase in family households headed by women, the growth
of single-person households, and the increasing proportion of the population living in
poverty. All of these trends are interrelated, a fact that partly explains their inexorable
qualities. All have important implications for public policy.
Trends and differentials in population growth and changes in age structure for cities
and suburbs are even more extreme than state or regional averages because of the
effects of age selectivity on migration. (See Tables 3 and 4.) Most demographic
34 changes taking place in metropolitan areas today were set in motion during the 1950s,
when young married couples, who were to become parents in the baby boom, left the
cities and settled the suburbs. Age structures in cities became rapidly skewed toward
the older ages as young adults and children moved out, while suburban population
growth from in-migration was further enhanced by the younger age structure, which
produced many births and few deaths. The vacated urban neighborhoods were gradually
repopulated by other groups, often nonwhite and Hispanic immigrants and their children
and later by the children of the original suburbanites. Thus, cities have swung back
toward younger age composition over the past two decades. Suburbs, on the other hand,
began to grow older as they stopped growing: the baby boomers moved away to college
or a job, while their parents, by and large, stayed put. By 1980, the gap between the
age structures of cities and suburbs had narrowed considerably, with suburbs of most
SMSAs in New England having only a slightly higher percentage of population under
the age of nineteen compared with core cities, and cities a slightly higher percentage of
their population over the age of 65 compared with suburbs (Appendix A). Soon the
majority of senior citizens will live in the inner suburbs, and many cities will look
youthful and energetic by comparison. With more suburban families entering the "empty
nest" period, and few young couples able to afford close-in suburban housing, there is
little in the demographic equation to help counterbalance the aging of their populations
through migration or natural increase. With aging populations, suburban growth should
turn negative in many areas, as has already occurred in the suburbs of Boston and
Pittsfield, Massachusetts, and Stamford, Connecticut (Appendix A).
The prognosis for population growth and age structure change in central cities is a
bit more uncertain. If the baby-boom cohorts living in cities continue to forego marriage
and childbearing and do not move out as rapidly when they approach middle age as did
their predecessors, the size of cities that have been losing population will tend to sta-
bilize over the balance of this century. If, on the other hand, the long-term trend toward
out-migration of those in their thirties and forties is sustained, cities will continue to
lose population. Future population loss in cities seems almost to be guaranteed for a
variety of other reasons as well. The baby-bust cohorts will not be in large enough num-
bers to replace the baby boom cohorts as the generations succeed one another. Further-
more, if minorities in cities like Boston or Hartford (which contain sizeable black and
Hispanic populations) are gradually able to overcome economic and social barriers and
move out to the suburbs, further central city population loss will be registered. More-
over, if nonmetropolitan areas and fast growth regions in the South and West exercise a
strong pull on young adults who might otherwise gravitate toward New England cities,
the consequence will be even greater population decline than is now projected. Finally,
if the trend toward the formation of smaller and smaller households persists, urban pop-
ulation will likewise tend to decline. Since opportunities to increase the housing stock
in cities are limited, smaller households translate into fewer people overall. This latter
point is not well understood by many who have interpreted recent population losses in
central cities purely in economic terms. 7
Already the number of households made up of only one person is between 25 and 30
percent in most core cities of New England metropolitan areas (Appendix A). This
could increase to 35 percent or more in the future. Boston's one-person households
totalled almost 37 percent in 1980. Smaller household sizes will translate into fewer
people when the number of households (occupied housing units) remains static or
declines. Because of the high cost of expanding the housing stock in central cities, we 35
can look forward to little new central city housing. On the other hand, demolition and
abandonment will likely persist and thereby remove housing from the existing stock.
The issue of population loss in central cities is such a vital one because shrinking tax
bases and reduced shares of federal funds allocated on the basis of population are not
generally offset by lower operating budgets for police, fire, garbage collection, road
maintenance and municipal employee pensions. A shrinking population base also means
less political clout within state legislatures and consequently less leverage in lobbying
for state funds as well.
For the most part, cities have tried to bolster their demographic well-being through
policies aimed at creating new jobs or keeping the jobs they have. As necessary as such
efforts are, housing, parking, school, and safety issues count heavily in whether new
jobs translate into new residents. Moreover, holding on to the baby boomers who now
live in cities, and who will be turning 40 over the remainder of this century, will
become increasingly difficult unless these quality of life issues are addressed. Cities
responsive to the needs and interests of this diverse group of baby-boom urbanites (gays,
singles, upwardly mobile minorities, single parents and dual-career couples) will enter
the next century in a stronger demographic position.
To a lesser extent the suburbs also will need to address the concerns of an increas-
ingly diverse population base. We have already mentioned that the elderly are a rapidly
growing constituency in most suburbs. Appendix A shows that nonfamily households in
the suburbs of most New England SMSAs now account for between 15 and 25 percent
of the total, with female-headed families approaching 10 percent. While the majority of
suburban households are still composed of married couples, only about half of them
have young children under the age of eighteen. Thus, the suburban stereotype of fami-
lies made up of husband, wife and children now accounts for only between one-quarter
to one-half of households in most metropolitan suburbs. Add to this the fact that more
and more wives and mothers are in the labor force, and the dynamics of suburban life
have shifted even further from what dominated in the 1950s and 1960s. There are atten-
dant security issues: with fewer women at home during the day, houses are vulnerable
to burglary, and children are increasingly left unsupervised at home after school. Non-
family households are viewed with suspicion by the neighbors. Widows who cannot
find alternative housing in their neighborhoods continue to occupy their large single-
family residences while the house and yard begin to deteriorate around them. The lack
of public transportation, which was never much of a problem for two car/one wife-
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chauffeur families, hits hard those who do not have use of an automobile. There is
opposition at zoning board hearings when someone wants to start a business in his
home or convert an unused part of his house to a rental apartment. Developers who
would like to develop empty land or demolish existing structures to build smaller, less
expensive cluster housing to meet the needs and budgets of nonfamily households are
vigorously opposed by abutting property owners. With the growing diversity of house-
holds and lifestyles, the suburbs are rapidly moving away from a politics of consensus
toward a politics of interest-group conflict and, ultimately, a politics of compromise.
One dimension of diversity that has yet to really emerge in New England suburbs is
racial diversity. While the City of Boston was 22.4 percent black and 6.4 percent
Hispanic in 1980, the balance of the SMSA was only 1.6 and 1.4 percent black and
Hispanic, respectively. In Hartford, blacks totalled 33.9 percent in the central city, with
36 20.5 percent Hispanic. Hartford suburbs, however, were made up of only 2.7 percent
black and 1.1 percent Hispanic according to the 1980 Census (Appendix A).
The increase in the nonwhite and Hispanic populations in places like Boston and
Hartford was initially caused by immigration, particularly in the late 1950s and 1960s.
Over the last decade, immigration of blacks has slowed dramatically, yet they continue
to increase in the total population because of an excess of births over deaths. Because
nonwhites and Hispanics are recent arrivals, there are relatively few elderly in these
groups, and, therefore, relatively few deaths. There are many more births, not so much
because of a large number of births per woman, but because there are many women in
the prime childbearing ages. Whites, on the other hand, often have more deaths than
births (e.g., in Boston) because of a higher fraction of the white population that is
elderly and because white women living in central cities have extremely low fertility
rates, less than half the level necessary for replacement. Because of the differences in
age structures and fertility rates between whites and nonwhites, we can expect contin-
ued racial turnover in central cities arising simply from differences in natural increase.
Racial turnover in suburbs remains dependent upon future patterns of migration,
which in turn will depend upon the ability of minorities to overcome the economic and
social barriers that have prevented them from taking up residence there in the past. In a
few metropolitan areas, such as Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, and Chicago, the non-
white working and middle classes have dramatically increased their representation in the
suburbs in recent years. Such a trend could be seen in those metropolitan areas in New
England where nonwhites and Hispanics are a significant percentage of central city pop-
ulations. However, as can be seen from the data in Appendix A, those areas are few in
number.
The poor relative economic position of minorities is reflected partly in the statistics
on the change in the poverty rates between 1969 and 1979 (Appendix A). However,
since the vast majority of SMSA central cities showed large increases in poverty rates
over the 1970s decade, more important than racial turnover has been the effect on pov-
erty rates of changes in household structure. Persons living in single-person households,
elderly households, and female-headed family households are all overrepresented in the
poverty index. For example, the central city portion of the Lawrence/Haverhill, Massa-
chusetts SMSA increased its share of persons in poverty by almost 50 percent over the
ten years of the 1970s, yet its minority population was still under 1 percent of the total
in 1980. Nonfamily and female-headed family households in Lawrence/Haverhill, how-
ever, had risen to 46.6 percent of the total by 1980. Where suburban areas have also
increased their poverty rates, the underlying cause has been primarily the same shift in
household structures.
Another factor in the increase in poverty rates is purely definitional. Because in-kind
transfers such as housing allowances, food stamps, Medicaid, school lunches, Meals on
Wheels, and subsidized transportation services are not counted when calculating poverty
statistics, "pure income" tends to overstate the poverty of many who receive this aid.
Another problem arises when unrelated individuals share a household and household
expenses. Their incomes are not pooled when calculating the poverty index, as are the
incomes of family members. Finally, the poverty statistic measures only income and not
wealth. Many elderly households show up pretty poorly on the income scale, yet their
members live quite comfortably in mortgage-free housing and draw from their savings.
Therefore, we must be careful not to take the crude poverty index literally when inter- 37
preting the relative well-being of households and persons in different cities and suburbs.
Yet, in a place like Danbury, Connecticut, which was economically "reborn" over
the 1970s, greater economic well-being was clearly reflected in a decline in the poverty
rate. Such good fortune must be considered a relatively rare experience for metropolitan
areas in New England. More characteristically, we should expect poverty rates to con-
tinue to creep upward because of changing household structures and the growing role of
transfers of goods and services (including barter and intergenerational transfers) in
household economies.
Because more diversified household structures mean a growing share of female-
headed households, and because women work fewer hours and earn less per hour than
do men, the income distribution of households has become more dispersed. Dual-
income professional households claim the upper-income bracket, while no-earner and
one-earner female-headed households fall into the lower. When these two groups are
pitted against each other in the marketplace, the poorer households simply cannot com-
pete. Housing is a good example of a scarce resource that is increasingly being placed
outside the reach of poor households. College education for one's children appears to
be another. Health care could very well become a third as employers begin to reduce
health-care benefits and insurers raise the co-pay share.
While the implications of a growing gap between the haves and have-nots seem
clear, the solutions are not. Affirmative action to upgrade job access and remuneration
for women and minorities would certainly help close the gap. But recent experience has
shown how slowly such changes take effect. Greater concern about the growth of dead-
end service-sector jobs and who gets trapped into such jobs is undoubtedly called for.
But many of the high-growth jobs, such as security guards, janitors, copy machine
operators, food service employees, and hospital orderlies will likely remain decidedly
dead-end. Highly subsidized child-care services that allow women to work more hours
and to keep more of what they earn would also be a step in the right direction. How-
ever, subsidized child care means that employers and upper income workers would get
to keep less of what they earn, a proposal that runs counter to the Reagan administra-
tion's economic policies. Ultimately, women may opt out of childbearing, as they
already appear to have done to some extent. When women stop having children, the
short-term economic well-being of their households is improved, but the long-term eco-
nomic well-being of the community is threatened, and the eventual burden placed on
the government to care for childless individuals in sickness and in old age is increased.
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Conclusion
This brief review of the demography of New England has proceeded from the macro to
the micro. We have contrasted the slow population growth projected for the region as a
whole with the significant changes taking place in age structure, geographic mobility,
residential location, household structure, racial composition and economic well-being in
individual cities and suburbs. Some of these demographic trends are universal, such as
the shifts in age structure. Others, such as racial turnover, are salient only in particular
areas. As we shift our focus from regional or state demographic trends down to local
levels, generalizations are increasingly difficult to make. Yet, it could easily be argued
that demographic trends at the local level are more extreme and therefore become more
important in informing public policy. The demographic history and future of each of
New England's towns and cities are highly variable. How the local scene stacks up to
the broader trends described in this paper should be a question foremost in the minds of
all planners and policymakers. Fortunately, it is a question that can be answered with
wise and timely planning decisions.
Appendix A
Selected Demographic Characteristics of New England Metropolitan Areas by Central
City and Suburbs
1980 Population
1980 1970-80 Spanish
Population Change Black Origin Under 18 Over 65
% % % % % %
Me. 1,125,000 + 13.2 0.3 0.4 34.9 12.5
Bangor SMSA 83,919 + 5.0 0.3 0.4 25.0 10.6
Central City Part 31,643 -4.6 0.5 0.4 23.8 13.1
Suburban Part 52,276 + 10.8 0.1 0.3 25.9 9.1
Lewiston-Auburn SMSA 72,378 -0.1 0.3 0.5 27.5 14.2
Central City Part 63,609 -3.5 0.4 0.4 26.6 15.0
Suburban Part 8,769 + 24.6 0.1 1.2 34.0 8.4
Portland SMSA 183,625 + 8.0 0.4 0.5 26.2 13.2
Central City Part 61,572 -5.4 0.9 0.6 23.0 16.6
Suburban Part 122,053 + 14.8 0.2 0.4 27.9 11.5
N.H. 921,000 + 24.8 0.4 0.6 28.1 11.2
Manchester SMSA 160,767 + 21.3 0.3 0.8 28.0 11.1
Central City Part 90,936 + 3.6 0.4 1.1 25.7 13.4
Suburban Part 69,831 + 44.3 0.3 0.5 31.1 8.0
Nashua SMSA 114,221 + 32.4 0.8 0.8 31.2 8.0
Central City Part 67,865 + 21.6 1.0 1.1 28.5 9.5
Suburban Part 46,356 + 48.2 0.5 0.4 35.3 6.0
Portsmouth-Dover-
Rochester SMSA 163,880 + 15.2 0.9 0.7 26.2 10.8
Central City Part 70,191 + 9.3 1.6 0.9 26.9 11.7
Suburban Part 93,689 + 19.6 0.4 0.6 25.7 10.1
Vt. 511,000 + 14.8 0.2 0.6 28.4 11.4
Burlington SMSA 114,070 + 16.0 0.4 0.8 27.5 7.7
Central City Part 37,712 -2.4 0.6 0.8 19.5 10.8
Suburban Part 76,358 + 25.1 0.3 0.8 31.4
(continued on
6.1
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Selected Demographic Characteristics of New England Metropolitan Areas by Central
City and Suburbs
1980 Population
1980 1970-80 Spanish
Population Change Black Origin Under 18 Over 65
% % % % % %
Mass. 5,737,000 + 0.8 3.9 2.5 26.0 12.7
Boston SMSA 2,763,357 -4.7 5.8 2.4 24.3 12.5
Central City Part 562,994 -12.2 22.4 6.4 21.6 12.7
Suburban Part 2,200,363 -2.8 1.6 1.4 25.0 12.4
Brockton SMSA 169,374 + 12.6 3.4 1.6 30.0 10.7
Central City Part 95,172 + 6.9 5.2 2.3 30.2 11.9
Suburban Part 74,202 + 19.9 1.1 0.7 29.8 9.2
Fall River SMSA 176,831 + 4.3 0.4 1.7 28.0 13.8
Central City Part 92,574 -4.5 0.5 2.4 26.9 16.6
Suburban Part 84,257 + 14.0 0.3 0.9 29.3 10.8
Fitchburg-
Leominster SMSA 99,957 + 2.9 1.5 2.7 27.5 11.8
Central City Part 74,088 -2.4 1.5 3.3 26.3 13.2
Suburban Part 25,869 + 18.1 1.6 0.9 31.0 7.9
Lawrence-
Haverhill SMSA 281,981 + 9.1 0.9 4.4 28.9 12.3
Central City Part 110,040 -2.5 1.8 10.0 28.0 15.4
Suburban Part 171,941 + 16.5 0.3 0.8 29.5 10.3
Lowell SMSA 233,410 + 6.9 0.8 2.3 30.9 9.3
Central City Part 92,418 -1.9 1.3 5.0 27.7 13.0
Suburban Part 140,992 + 12.7 0.4 0.6 33.0 6.8
New Bedford SMSA 169,425 + 5.0 1.8 3.1 26.7 14.6
Central City Part 98,478 -3.2 2.7 4.6 26.2 16.2
Suburban Part 70,947 + 16.4 0.6 1.0 27.1 12.4
Pittsfield SMSA 90,505 -6.5 1.5 0.5 26.4 14.2
Central City Part 51,974 -8.8 2.4 0.5 27.0 14.1
Suburban Part 38,531 -3.4 0.3 0.4 25.7 14.2
Springfield-Chicopee-
Holyoke SMSA 530,668 -2.0 5.4 4.5 26.4 12.3
Central City Part 252,109 -10.0 10.5 8.3 26.8 14.1
Suburban Part 278,559 + 5.2 0.8 1.1 26.0 10.7
Worcester SMSA 372,940 + 0.2 1.4 2.2 26.5 13.4
Central City Part 161,799 -8.4 2.9 4.3 23.6 16.3
Suburban Part 211,141 + 6.8 0.4 0.5 28.8 11.3
R.I. 947,000 -0.3 2.9 2.1 25.7 13.4
Providence-Warwick-
Pawtucket SMSA 919,216 + 1.1 2.7 2.1 25.7 13.4
Central City Part 315,131 -6.8 6.3 3.8 24.4 14.9
Suburban Part 604,085 + 5.2 0.8 1.2 26.4 12.6
Ct. 3,108,000 + 2.5 7.0 4.0 26.5 11.7
Bridgeport SMSA 395,455 + 1.6 8.8 7.7 26.7 12.2
Central City Part 142,546 -8.9 21.0 18.7 27.9 13.4
Suburban Part 252,909 + 7.5 2.0 1.5 26.0 11.6
Bristol SMSA 73,762 + 5.6 1.4 1.5 27.9 10.3
Central City Part 57,370 + 3.4 1.6 1.7 27.1 10.9
Suburban Part 16,392 + 13.3 0.6 0.9 30.7 8.2
(continued on next page)
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1980 Population
1980 1970-80 Spanish
Population Change Black Origin Under 18 Over 65
% % % % % %
Danbury SMSA 146,405 + 26.7 2.9 2.1 30.1 9.3
Central City Part 60,470 + 19.1 5.7 3.3 27.3 10.7
Suburban Part 85,935 + 32.0 0.9 1.2 32.1 8.4
Hartford SMSA 726,114 + 0.8 8.5 4.7 26.6 11.4
Central City Part 136,392 -13.7 33.9 20.5 29.0 11.4
Suburban Part 589,722 + 4.2 2.7 1.1 26.1 11.4
Meriden SMSA 57,118 + 2.1 3.4 8.2 26.5 12.7
Central City Part 57,118 + 2.1 3.4 8.2 26.5 12.7
Suburban Part — — — — — —
New Britain SMSA 142,241 -2.1 3.4 5.0 24.3 12.4
Central City Part 73,840 -11.5 5.8 8.7 21.3 14.4
Suburban Part 68,401 + 8.0 0.9 1.0 27.4 10.2
New Haven-
West Haven SMSA 417,592 + 1.5 12.0 3.2 25.4 12.3
Central City Part 179,293 -5.7 25.2 6.0 24.6 13.0
Suburban Part 238,299 + 6.9 2.1 1.1 26.0 11.8
New London-
Norwich SMSA 248,554 + 2.8 3.6 1.9 27.3 10.8
Central City Part 66,916 -8.8 8.2 3.5 24.3 13.2
Suburban Part 181,638 + 7.1 1.9 1.3 28.4 9.9
NorwalkSMSA 126,692 + 0.7 8.9 4.1 26.6 9.9
Central City Part 77,767 -1.9 13.9 5.8 25.4 10.8
Suburban Part 48,925 + 4.8 0.8 1.3 28.6 8.4
Stamford SMSA 198,854 -3.6 8.4 3.7 25.0 12.4
Central City Part 102,453 -5.8 15.0 5.6 24.5 12.0
Suburban Part 96,401 -1.3 1.4 1.7 25.5 12.7
Waterbury SMSA 228,178 + 5.2 5.8 3.6 27.0 13.8
Central City Part 103,260 -4.4 11.6 6.7 25.8 15.5
Suburban Part 124,912 + 3.6 1.0 1.0 28.0 12.4
1980 Households Persons in Poverty
Non- Female Single Change
Family Family Person 1979 1969 Poverty Rate
% % % % % %
Me. 34.4 12.2 28.6 13.0 13.2 + 5.3
Bangor SMSA 29.2 10.3 21.8 12.4 NA —
Central City Part 37.0 11.8 28.4 14.6 14.7 -0.7
Suburban Part 23.7 8.5 17.1 11.1 NA —
Lewiston-Auburn SMSA 28.8 11.2 25.0 12.9 12.1 + 6.6
Central City Part 30.8 11.3 26.8 15.7 12.4 + 26.6
Suburban Part 14.3 10.5 11.9 7.4 7.9 -6.3
Portland SMSA 30.5 10.5 24.6 10.5 10.3 + 1.9
Central City Part 42.6 12.5 34.1 15.4 14.5 + 6.2
Suburban Part 23.3 9.3 19.0 8.0 6.6 + 21.2
N.H. 26.3 8.4 21.4 8.5 8.8 -3.4
Manchester SMSA 27.5 9.7 22.6 7.9 9.9 -20.2
Central City Part 32.3 11.6 26.9 10.4 10.1 + 3.0
Suburban Part 20.3 6.8 16.1 4.6 8.9 -48.3
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1980 Households Persons in Poverty
Non- Female Single Change
Family Family Person 1979 1969 Poverty Rate
% % % % % %
Nashua SMSA 23.8 8.7 19.0 5.3 6.3 -15.9
Central City Part 28.1 9.6 22.6 6.5 6.4 + 1.6
Suburban Part 16.4 6.5 12.8 3.5 7.7 -54.5
Portsmouth-Dover-
Rochester SMSA 28.4 8.9 21.8 9.5 NA —
Central City Part 31.4 10.0 24.7 9.4 NA —
Suburban Part 26.2 8.0 19.6 9.6 NA —
Vt. 28.1 9.0 21.9 12.1 11.6 + 4.3
Burlington SMSA 30.7 8.8 21.3 10.2 NA —
Central City Part 45.5 10.1 30.7 16.2 11.8 + 37.3
Suburban Part 22.9 8.1 16.4 7.2 NA —
Mass. 29.2 11.5 24.4 9.6 8.3 + 15.7
Boston SMSA 32.5 11.7 26.3 9.4 8.5 + 10.6
Central City Part 46.7 16.2 36.8 20.2 15.4 + 31.2
Suburban Part 28.5 10.4 23.3 6.6 6.3 + 4.8
Brockton SMSA 25.1 12.2 21.7 9.7 7.2 + 34.7
Central City Part 28.4 14.6 24.8 12.6 8.6 + 46.5
Suburban Part 20.3 8.6 17.2 6.0 5.9 + 1.7
Fall River SMSA 23.8 11.1 21.9 11.1 11.2 -0.9
Central City Part 28.9 13.6 27.3 14.8 13.6 + 8.8
Suburban Part 17.5 8.1 15.2 7.0 6.7 + 4.5
Fitchburg-
Leominster SMSA 26.2 10.6 22.5 9.5 8.0 + 18.8
Central City Part 28.9 11.5 24.7 11.2 8.7 + 28.7
Suburban Part 17.8 8.0 15.6 4.6 5.2 -11.5
Lawrence-
Haverhill SMSA 25.3 11.7 22.4 10.8 7.7 + 40.3
Central City Part 31.2 15.4 28.0 15.5 10.4 + 49.0
Suburban Part 21.1 9.0 18.4 7.8 5.1 + 52.9
Lowell SMSA 21.0 11.3 18.6 8.2 7.8 + 5.1
Central City Part 31.1 15.3 26.8 13.5 11.3 + 19.5
Suburban Part 13.1 8.2 12.2 4.7 4.9 -4.1
New Bedford SMSA 25.7 12.2 23.4 12.2 13.0 -6.2
Central City Part 29.2 14.7 26.8 16.2 15.1 + 7.3
Suburban Part 20.3 8.3 18.1 6.6 8.6 -23.3
Pittsfield SMSA 26.9 10.8 23.9 9.0 7.2 + 25.0
Central City Part 27.9 12.2 24.8 10.3 7.4 + 39.2
Suburban Part 25.5 8.7 22.6 7.2 6.7 + 7.5
Springfield-Chicopee-
Holyoke SMSA 26.9 12.2 23.4 11.3 9.0 + 25.6
Central City Part 29.8 15.9 26.6 16.1 11.5 + 40.0
Suburban Part 24.5 9.1 20.7 7.0 6.0 + 16.7
Worcester SMSA 26.8 11.0 23.2 9.6 7.7 + 24.7
Central City Part 33.4 14.0 28.5 14.4 10.0 + 44.0
Suburban Part 21.4 8.5 18.9 5.9 5.1 + 15.7
41
(continued on next page)
New England Journal of Public Policy Winter/Spring 1985
Appendix A (continued from previous page)
Selected Demographic Characteristics of New England Metropolitan Areas by Central
City and Suburbs
1980 Households Persons in Poverty
42
Non- Female Single Change
Family Family Person 1979 1969 Poverty Rate
% % % % % %
R.I. 27.4 11.2 23.9 10.3 10.5 -1.9
Providence-Warwick-
Pawtucket SMSA 27.4 11.2 23.9 10.5 10.2 + 2.9
Central City Part 33.4 13.6 29.2 14.6 13.8 + 5.8
Suburban Part 23.9 9.8 20.9 8.4 8.0 + 5.0
Ct. 25.6 10.8 21.6 8.0 7.0 + 14.3
Bridgeport SMSA 23.7 12.6 20.6 9.9 7.1 + 39.4
Central City Part 31.7 18.9 28.1 20.4 11.5 + 77.4
Suburban Part 18.8 8.8 16.0 4.0 4.1 -2.4
Bristol SMSA 23.4 9.9 20.3 5.4 5.0 + 8.0
Central City Part 24.1 10.5 21.0 5.9 4.8 + 22.9
Suburban Part 20.7 7.5 17.6 3.7 6.1 -39.3
Danbury SMSA 21.7 8.4 18.0 4.6 6.0 -23.3
Central City Part 26.9 10.0 22.4 6.7 7.1 -5.6
Suburban Part 17.7 7.1 14.6 3.1 3.9 -20.5
Hartford SMSA 26.5 11.1 21.9 7.9 6.9 + 14.5
Central City Part 40.9 21.9 34.7 25.2 16.4 + 53.7
Suburban Part 22.9 8.4 18.7 3.9 3.9 0.0
Meriden SMSA 27.0 11.0 24.1 7.4 6.7 + 10.4
Central City Part 27.0 11.0 24.1 7.4 6.7 + 10.4
Suburban Part — — — — — —
New Britain SMSA 27.2 10.4 22.9 7.7 6.6 + 16.7
Central City Part 33.6 12.3 27.9 11.8 8.5 + 38.8
Suburban Part 19.4 8.0 16.8 3.3 3.9 -15.4
New Haven-
West Haven SMSA 28.2 12.0 23.6 10.5 9.8 + 7.1
Central City Part 36.7 16.9 30.4 19.1 14.0 + 36.4
Suburban Part 21.3 8.1 18.1 4.0 7.0 -42.9
New London-
Norwich SMSA 25.3 9.7 20.9 8.6 10.1 -14.9
Central City Part 33.7 12.9 31.1 14.5 10.9 + 33.0
Suburban Part 21.9 8.4 16.7 6.4 9.6 -33.3
NorwalkSMSA 23.8 9.9 19.3 5.3 5.7 -7.0
Central City Part 27.2 11.4 22.4 7.0 6.5 + 7.7
Suburban Part 17.9 7.3 13.9 2.6 4.8 -45.8
Stamford SMSA 25.5 10.3 21.6 5.4 5.4 0.0
Central City Part 28.7 12.0 24.6 7.7 7.0 + 10.0
Suburban Part 21.9 8.3 18.2 3.0 3.6 -16.7
Waterbury SMSA 24.2 11.0 21.7 8.9 7.2 + 23.6
Central City Part 28.8 14.5 26.2 14.1 9.5 + 48.4
Suburban Part 20.0 7.9 17.6 4.6 4.7 -2.1
Sources: 1970 Census of Population, Supplementary Report, "Poverty Status in 1969 and 1959 of Persons
and Families, for States, SMSA's, Central Cities and Counties," 1970 and 1960 PC(51)-105; 1980 Census of
Population and Housing, Summary Characteristics for Governmental Units and Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Areas, PHC80-3; U.S. Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book, 1977; U.S. Bureau of the
Census, State and Metropolitan Area Data Book, 1982; U.S. Bureau of the Census, County and City Data
Book, 1983.
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